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One year into his second term as President of the United States, Donald Trump has doubled down on his ‘America First’ agenda. He has actively attacked multilateral institutions, claiming they are working against the US. At the time of writing, the second Trump administration (hereafter Trump 2.0) has criticised NATO, undermined the World Trade Organization (WTO), withdrawn funding from the United Nations, established the rivalrous ‘Board of Peace’, and exited the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris Agreement (for the second time), and more than 60 other institutions.
While the scope and intensity of the ongoing assault against the rules-based multilateral order is greater under Trump 2.0, an examination of Trump 1.0’s contestation of international institutions offers three important lessons for defenders of this order. In this blog post, I draw on my recent article in International Affairs to develop this assessment.
Trump Challenges Organisations Selectively and Strategically
Despite popular assumptions, Trump’s contestation of international institutions is neither ‘irrational’ nor ‘impulsive’, but strategic. During Trump 1.0, the degree of US control over institutions shaped the mode of contestation, be it through criticism, subversion, or exit. Where the US enjoyed strong influence, such as in NATO or the World Bank, Trump 1.0 limited contestation to criticism and reform demands. Where control was weaker, contestation was intensified. In the case of the WTO, Trump blocked Appellate Body appointments, while in the UN Human Rights Council and the WHO he opted for exit.
This correlation between the degree of control and the mode of contestation persists under Trump 2.0. Contestation has been limited to criticism of institutions where the US retains strong influence, including the World Bank and NATO. By contrast, in organisations where US influence is weaker, Trump 2.0 is escalating contestation. This has manifested in the US continuing the WTO blockade and again exiting the WHO and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
Institutions Can Resist Trump’s Contestation
The second lesson from studying Trump 1.0 is that multilateral institutions challenged by the US are not doomed to fail; they often prove surprisingly resilient. In two-thirds of the contested institutions, cooperation did not break down. When Trump 1.0 withdrew from the Paris Agreement, remaining members not only sustained but strengthened their climate commitments. Likewise, after the US stopped funding the UN Population Fund, other states increased their support for women’s reproductive health.
The WHO also showed resilience when the US first withheld funding during COVID-19 and later withdrew altogether, with remaining members defending the organisation’s mandate and boosting financial support.
Only around a quarter of contested institutions have declined or failed. In the case of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the funding gap left by the US was not filled, forcing the agency to scale back services for Palestinians. The only institution that collapsed entirely was the Iran ‘nuclear deal’ (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), as Iran moved closer to weapons-grade enrichment following the US exit.
Western Powers Must Help Institutions to Adapt
Finally, my analysis of Trump 1.0 shows that active responses by Western powers are crucial to institutional resilience. Western states stepped up to help institutions adapt to the challenges posed by Trump, including by accommodating US demands. In the World Bank, the IMF, and NATO, Western states and leaders of international organisations pushed for concessions that appeased Trump 1.0 and, in turn, contained US contestation.
Western governments and the EU must recognise that maintaining the rules-based order is in their core interest.
Adaptation can also mean defending institutions against US criticism, filling the leadership gaps left by US withdrawal, and charting a path forward for remaining members. The EU led by example by strengthening its own climate commitments under the Paris Agreement and reining in Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who threatened to follow Trump.
Accommodating Trump 2.0 Where Possible, Defending Institutions Where Necessary
Even with these lessons, it is too early to tell how institutions will cope with contestation under Trump 2.0. Indeed, if alternative leadership is key to institutional resilience, there are reasons for concern when we recall that Western states and the EU have largely avoided initiating substantive reforms to institutions contested by Trump 2.0.
Western governments and the EU must recognise that maintaining the rules-based order is in their core interest. US security guarantees appear increasingly uncertain and, while greater defence autonomy is necessary to reduce dependencies and deter Russia, Western governments and the EU will not become great powers on a par with the US or China any time soon.
To maintain the rules-based order, the West must act decisively. Where possible, Western governments should accommodate Trump, addressing the root causes of US dissatisfaction and the growing relevance of the global South. Institutional adaptation could include policy-specific opt-outs or vetoes, or financial burden-sharing. Where accommodation would undermine the core principles of the rules-based order, Western powers should defend institutions together with like-minded partners in the global South.
Tim Heinkelmann-Wild is a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence and a senior researcher and lecturer at Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich.
This blog post was originally published on the International Affairs blog. It is based on a longer article, "(De)coding ‘America First’: Trump's Contestation of International Institutions and its Consequences."
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