Your recent article maps out what we know about the relationship between ordinary people and international organisations (IOs). What shapes public opinion on IOs and how much does that support actually matter?
For a long time, scholars assumed that ordinary people had little interest in international politics. Foreign policy, so the story went, was something elites conducted largely behind closed doors. But nowadays, citizens are more aware of global affairs, and their opinions can shape how international politics unfolds.
We see this increase in citizens’ engagement in global politics in multiple ways. Public protests have targeted IOs such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and trade agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Voters have also expressed dissatisfaction with global governance and multilateralism, instead backing anti-globalist leaders and parties across the globe. At the same time, civil society groups have pushed for a greater voice within organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, demanding more fairness and effectiveness. Survey evidence, including from the World Values Survey, further suggests that many citizens have a basic understanding of global governance.
This shift motivates our article: if citizens are not simply ‘passive’ or ‘uninformed,’ but rather actively involved in global governance, then understanding what they think – and why – becomes essential. In our article, we identify three key dimensions of the relationship between IOs and public opinion: (1) what shapes public opinion on IOs, (2) how much public opinion matters, and (3) how IOs themselves influence public views. Further, we discuss the existing literature on public opinion and identify gaps.
What, then, shapes public opinion? How people view IOs depends in part on personal factors. People often evaluate IOs through a pragmatic lens: Will this IO bring economic or social benefits, or not? Attitudes are also shaped by citizens’ more complex political values and social identities, such as their openness to international cooperation or immigration, or their sense of identification with national and/or global communities.
"Both how IOs work and what they deliver matter for public support."
An IO’s organisational features also play an important role. Research shows that citizens care about how IOs operate: whether their decision-making processes are fair, whether they are inclusive, and whether they actually solve problems. In short, both how IOs work and what they deliver matter for public support. Finally, communication about IOs is becoming increasingly relevant. Since most people don’t follow global politics too closely, they rely on cues from politicians, media, and other actors. These cues can work to (de)legitimise IOs. At the same time, peer-to-peer communication – i.e., how citizens discuss these issues with each other – matters as well, though this is still less well understood.
How much does public support matter? Evidence suggests that public opinion is increasingly impacting the workings of IOs and the state of multilateralism. For one, declining IO legitimacy writ large can push states toward alternative forms of global governance or unilateralism. Moreover, IOs depend on member states for mandates and funding; governments, in turn, respond to domestic constituencies. Public scepticism can therefore constrain IO authority, financing, and policy scope. Our article shows that public opinion influences IOs via direct pathways (e.g., protests, compliance, or resistance) and indirect pathways, where governments translate domestic preferences into international positions.
Turning to the other side of that relationship: your research also examines how IOs themselves try to communicate with and influence the public. What works, what doesn't, and what should IOs be doing differently?
Since most citizens have limited time and prior knowledge about foreign affairs. Communication only works when it is credible, simple, and clearly linked to issues people care about. This means that endorsements and cues from trusted actors tend to work well. When IOs are supported by national governments, experts, or domestic organisations that citizens already trust, their messages are more persuasive (although I should mention that these other actors are increasingly contesting IOs). Framing global issues in a way that connects them to domestic political concerns like jobs or national security will have more impact than abstract messages. Research has also shown that negative messages can sway public opinion more than positive messages about IOs.
These are a few ‘best practices’ when communicating with the public – but we still don’t know much about how durable and effective such framing effects are, and why IOs have difficulty convincing people of their legitimacy when they are not endorsed by trusted domestic actors. It could be due to the technocratic tone common in IO communications: dense reports, technical language, or highly abstract claims. It could also be entirely unrelated to issues of communication. If an IO is perceived as ineffective or unfair, even well-crafted messages will struggle to convince the public.
"If an IO is perceived as ineffective or unfair, even well-crafted messages will struggle to convince the public."
One of the literature’s central findings is that IOs operate in competitive information environments. Political actors, including governments and populist leaders, actively and frequently frame IOs – whether it be in positive or negative terms. In such contexts, IOs’ own communication is often reactive rather than agenda-setting, and its effectiveness depends on how it interacts with these competing narratives set by political agendas. However, we know little about these competitive dynamics in the context of global governance. On the whole, there is a need for research on communication about IOs, especially at a time when IOs are facing demands for more legitimate and effective governance.
What lessons does your research offer for Europe in navigating multilateral cooperation in an increasingly contested world?
For Europe, the central insight is that multilateral cooperation is increasingly dependent on what the greater public thinks of IOs. Public support for IOs cannot be simply taken for granted anymore. In the words of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, the era of “permissive consensus” is over. This means that IOs ought to be reformed, improved, and more strongly legitimised – an effort that would require the EU to link international cooperation to concrete benefits for citizens across different contexts, while ensuring that institutions are perceived as fair and effective.
Communication surrounding IOs matters, but it must be credible and rooted in performance, not only in rhetoric. The research we discuss in the article suggests that the success of IOs’ attempts at self-legitimation – for example through their websites, social media communication, and annual reports – typically depends on how they frame both performance and procedures. Some find no or weak effects of IO self-legitimation. Others find that IO self-legitimation does not impact public opinion on its own but can be effective in countering criticism of IOs by NGOs. One explanation for this inconclusive evidence may be that IOs lack credibility when promoting themselves and come across as less impartial than, say, NGOs. Another may be that IOs are still developing their capacity to explain and defend their actions to the public, especially in a polarised social media landscape.
"Public opinion is not mere background noise, but it isn’t omnipotent either."
In a more contested geopolitical environment, European actors should try to anticipate which global questions will likely become politicised and which competing narratives about IOs need counteracting. Strengthening ties between EU-level governance and domestic publics – through transparency, responsiveness, and domestic intermediaries – is becoming ever more critical to sustaining support for multilateralism. This also means that policies such as the EU’s structural and cohesion policies – central tenets aimed at reducing disparities and differences between European states and regions – are important to maintain, as they can serve as a tool to strengthen ties between European institutions and citizens.
In sum, EU policymakers can safely assume that public opinion is not mere background noise, but it isn’t omnipotent either. It plays an important and growing role in shaping international cooperation within Europe and between European and other states. People’s views can support or constrain IOs, often indirectly through governments and political debates at home. As a result, what citizens think, how and why those views are formed, and how the EU should communicate about IOs should become an even more central part of European governance.
Lisa Dellmuth is a Professor of International Relations at Stockholm University and Co-director of the Stockholm Center on Global Governance (SCGG). Her research focuses on international political economy, public opinion, and global governance.
Photo: Unsplash / Edwin Andrade
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