Your book challenges the idea that multilateralism naturally promotes democracy. What are “dictator clubs” and how do they help to sustain authoritarian rule?
There is a common assumption that international cooperation naturally supports democratisation – but that isn’t always true. In The Dictators’ Club, I show how authoritarian regimes have long built regional organisations – what I call “dictator clubs” – to help them survive. These clubs have proliferated over time. Many were founded during post-colonial state-building in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Arab League dating back to 1945. Today, there are roughly 35 authoritarian-led regional organisations around the world – nearly twice as many as democratic ones. From Latin America to Africa, the Middle East to Eurasia, these organisations have remained largely authoritarian even as some of their memberships have diversified.
Despite regional differences, their underlying purpose is the same – to help authoritarian regimes manage the political risks of staying in power. Dictator clubs do this through three main mechanisms: resource redistribution, internal relationship management, and international shielding.
First, dictator clubs redistribute resources to stabilise members who are in crisis. A case in point is Bahrain during the 2011 Arab Spring. In response to the wave of anti-government demonstrations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deployed troops and provided emergency funds to the monarchy, enabling it to suppress protests and reassert control. These redistributive payments continue to this day, with GCC credit lines propping up the Bahraini regime as it battles inflation and declining energy revenues since 2020.
Second, these organisations manage relationships among their members to forestall regional pressure towards democratisation. During and after Zimbabwe’s 2008 election crisis, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) protected Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe from democratic challengers. It blocked the release of independent election reports from South African experts, constrained calls from neighbouring Zambia for military intervention, dismantled the SADC human rights court after it ruled against Mugabe, and ultimately brokered a deal that kept Mugabe in power despite blatant election fraud. Solidarity among incumbents and consensual decision-making prevented challengers from mounting a successful move against the regime.
Despite regional differences, their underlying purpose is the same – to help authoritarian regimes manage the political risks of staying in power.
Third, dictator clubs shield their members from international sanctions and reputational damage. When Nicaragua came under international pressure for democratic backsliding, the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) stepped in with financial support and political cover. They mounted a delegitimation campaign against the Oraganization of American States (OAS) to deflect criticism and sought to block human rights issues from being raised at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
These mechanisms turn regime survival into a collective project. Yet their success depends less on the presence of a powerful regional hegemon than political debates might suggest. While dominant states like China or Saudi Arabia often spearhead these initiatives, they are rarely decisive on their own. More important is a shared institutional commitment to mutual protection and a strong emphasis on boosting legitimacy. This is one of the most common and powerful functions of dictator clubs: they endorse flawed elections, validate constitutional changes, and amplify regime narratives that project domestic order and popular support.
However, there is an important caveat here: these clubs are built to protect regimes, not individual rulers. When Zimbabwe’s Mugabe was ousted by his own party in 2017, the SADC did not intervene – not because it had turned against authoritarianism, but because the underlying regime remained intact. As long as successor elites preserve the ruling coalition, dictator clubs are often indifferent to who holds the top position.
You write that authoritarian regimes increasingly mimic the language and structure of liberal institutions, while hollowing out their core democratic norms. What does this mean for the legitimacy of multilateralism as a global system?
Interestingly, a growing number of authoritarian regimes do not outright reject democracy or multilateralism. Instead, they participate in international organisations and invoke liberal and democratic principles like democracy, inclusion, and equality, while stripping them of their substantive and procedural value. Most dictator clubs are well versed in the language of democracy and adopt procedures associated with democratic decision-making such as election monitoring – only to then use them to entrench their own systems and discredit critical observers.
The effects are also increasingly visible on the global stage. Within the United Nations system, autocracies have formed cross-regional coalitions like the Group of Friends in the Defence of the Charter of the United Nations. While claiming to democratise international relations, promote a pluralistic international order, and oppose unilateral coercive measures, these autocracies ultimately seek a return to a minimalist multilateralism with absolute state sovereignty as its core norm – a system that would insulate them from any responsibility to uphold human rights or the principles of international humanitarian law.
For example, autocracies have successfully steered debates on internet governance into forums that privilege state sovereignty under the banner of democratising international relations, effectively sidelining critical civil society voices. Similarly, efforts to elevate the right to development within the UNHCR reframe human rights as subordinate to state-led development, limiting external accountability in the name of fairness.
These moves present a significant threat to the legitimacy of the multilateral system – not because liberalism is overreaching, as some scholars argue, but because it is being systematically subverted from within. While the inconsistencies in how liberal democracies apply and uphold international law should not be ignored, the recent crisis of multilateralism stems less from liberal institutions collapsing under their own weight or expanding too far than from the strategic mobilisation of authoritarian actors to reshape multilateral institutions to serve their own interest. Dictator clubs are one manifestation of this broader strategy.
What should European policymakers take away from your findings, especially as they engage with authoritarian-led regional blocs?
European policymakers face a difficult but unavoidable task: defending democracy within a multilateral system increasingly shaped by authoritarian cooperation. On this point, the key takeaway from The Dictators’ Club is clear – retreating from international institutions or accommodating authoritarian narratives will only hasten the erosion of democratic norms.
So, what to do? First, Europe must remain engaged in international institutions. Withdrawing from these arenas only creates a vacuum for authoritarian influence to grow unchecked. If dictator clubs are becoming more adept at protecting their own, defenders of democracy and the rules-based international order must be willing to do the same.
Still, institutional presence is not enough: legitimacy depends on outcomes. If the liberal order is to remain credible, it must address inequality both within democratic states and across the international system. Europe should match its normative leadership with material investment, ensuring sustained funding for institutions that protect rights, monitor abuses, and facilitate civic participation. Budgets of international organisations are mere rounding errors in the national budgets of most European member states: withholding contributions or cutting staff is thus less about fiscal necessity than political signalling. Norms cannot be defended if the very organisations designed to uphold them are hollowed out by resource constraints.
The key takeaway is clear – retreating from international institutions or accommodating authoritarian narratives will only hasten the erosion of democratic norms.
In addition, European policymakers must avoid legitimising authoritarian regimes through transactional cooperation. Partnerships on energy, migration, or security that ignore human rights violations not only undermine liberal credibility: they also strengthen authoritarian actors and their international networks. Europe’s support for regional actors must be consistent with its core values and – at the very least – avoid actively supporting the most egregious atrocities.
Finally, Europe must reinvest in coalition-building. As my book shows, many autocratic regional organisations are not closed clubs but contested spaces – but contesting them requires strategic, principled engagement. Thus, European policymakers should cultivate ties with democratically oriented elites, support civil society actors, and invest in cross-regional partnerships that sustain liberal norms from the ground up.
This contribution is based on the author's recent book, How Regional Organizations Sustain Authoritarian Rule: The Dictators' Club.
Maria Debre is a Professor at Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen (Germany), where she holds the Chair for International Relations. She is also a member of the ENSURED Expert Network. Her research focuses on the role of regime type in global governance and challenges to multilateral organisations.
Photo: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in 2017. Wikimedia (CC BY-SA 2.0)
.png)
